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THE ROLE OF BLUE SKY LAWS AFTER  
NSMIA AND THE JOBS ACT 
RUTHEFORD B. CAMPBELL, JR.† 
ABSTRACT 
  State securities laws—in particular, state laws requiring that 
securities offered by issuers be registered with the states—have been an 
impediment to the efficient movement of capital to its highest and best 
use. The pernicious effects of these laws—generally referred to as “blue 
sky laws”—have been felt most acutely by small businesses, a vital 
component of our national economy. 
  It has been difficult to remedy this problem. States and state 
regulators have been tenacious in protecting their registration authority 
from federal preemption. The Securities and Exchange Commission, 
on the other hand, has been reluctant to advocate for preemption and 
unwilling to exercise its delegated power to expand preemption by 
regulation. 
  In recent years some progress has been made toward a more 
efficient regulation of capital formation, principally as a result of some 
congressional preemption of state registration authority. Nonetheless, 
state registration provisions continue to impede significantly 
businesses’—especially small businesses’—efficient access to external 
capital.  
  Further gains in efficient regulation of capital formation can be 
achieved but require actions both by states and the federal government. 
States must allocate more resources and effort toward vigorous 
enforcement of their antifraud provisions. At the federal level, 
Congress must preempt completely state registration authority. This 
duty of preemption falls to Congress, because the Commission has 
shown a sustained unwillingness to exercise its broad, delegated power 
to preempt state registration authority. 
Copyright © 2016 Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In our system of federalism, it has proven difficult to achieve an 
efficient regime regulating capital formation—an overall regime that 
facilitates the movement of capital to its highest and best use with a 
minimum of transaction costs. 
This difficulty is perhaps not surprising in light of the fact that 
historically our rules governing capital formation have been generated 
by our federal government and also by each individual state. In the best 
of cases, the good-faith, idiosyncratic views of multiple sovereign 
rulemakers and administrators about what is “good” for their 
particular citizens may differ. It also is possible, of course, that rank 
turf battles could erupt—battles driven not by good-faith 
disagreements over “good” regulation but, instead, by less noble 
factors or considerations.  
In any event, in a system of federalism, we may wind up with an 
overall regime that does not correct market imperfections but, instead, 
creates additional impediments to the efficient flow of capital to its 
highest and best use. Unfortunately, this has been the case in the 
United States. 
The focus of this Article is on blue sky laws. These are the state 
laws that most directly impact capital formation. The laws require that 
companies seeking external capital file registration statements with 
states1 and prohibit those companies from engaging in deceptive or 
manipulative conduct in connection with their capital-raising 
activities.2  
Historically, these blue sky laws and regulations—in particular, 
the state provisions requiring that securities offered by issuers be 
registered with the states—have been an impediment within our 
market economy to the efficient movement of capital to its highest and 
best use. The pernicious effects of these state laws have been felt most 
acutely in regard to small-business capital formation.  
 
 1. See, e.g., UNIF. SEC. ACT § 301 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE 
LAWS 1956) (requiring the registration of securities). 
 2. See, e.g., id. § 101 (prohibiting, inter alia, material misstatements in connection with the 
sale of securities). In LOUIS LOSS, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, 1 SECURITIES 
REGULATION 15 (5th ed. 2013), the authors refer to the “prescription of fraud” and the “policing 
of affirmative disclosure of corporate information” as the “basic foundation of any system of 
investor protection.”  
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In more recent times, the problems wrought by these blue sky laws 
have been ameliorated, at least to an extent, by some federal 
preemption of state authority over registration.3 This Article 
demonstrates, however, a continuing harmful impact of blue sky laws 
on the efficient allocation of capital.  
Further gains in efficiency in capital formation, particularly capital 
formation by small businesses, require the complete elimination of 
state authority over registration and the redeployment of state 
resources into the enforcement of states’ own antifraud provisions. The 
Article shows, however, the difficulties within our system of federalism 
in achieving this outcome and argues that any solution to the pernicious 
effects of state registration authority depends on Congress’s creating a 
comprehensive federal statute that preempts all state authority over 
the registration of securities.  
Part I of this Article provides an overview of the history of the 
relationship between state and federal governments in the regulation 
of capital formation. Part II explains the current role of blue sky laws 
in regard to capital-formation regulation. Part III analyzes the extent 
to which today’s blue sky laws promote efficient capital allocation. The 
Conclusion reiterates the view that although efficiency has improved, 
further progress on that score is needed and requires congressional 
preemption of state authority over registration and a redeployment of 
state regulatory resources.  
I.  HISTORY OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL 
REGULATION (AND REGULATORS) OF CAPITAL FORMATION 
A. Before the National Securities Market Improvement Act (NSMIA) 
Two historical facts continue to impact the nature of the rules 
governing capital formation within our system of federalism. The first 
 
 3. In 1996, Congress enacted the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
Broadly stated, NSMIA preempted state registration authority over the offer and sale of 
securities (1) listed on a national securities exchange; (2) issued by a registered investment 
company; (3) offered and sold to “qualified purchasers,” as defined by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (the Commission); and (4) offered and sold under the exemption provided 
by 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2016). See 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012). In 2012, Congress passed the Jumpstart 
Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012), further preempting 
some state authority over registration. For a summary of federal preemption of state authority 
over registration, see infra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.  
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is that states developed comprehensive statutes governing capital 
formation before the federal government passed its securities 
legislation.  
In 1911, Kansas enacted a broad statute governing the offer and 
sale of securities.4 The statute required the registration of securities 
and the licensing of persons involved in the business of selling 
securities.5 Previously, there were no comprehensive statutes—either 
state or federal—regulating the offer and sale of securities,6 although 
some states had earlier enacted statutes regulating certain aspects of 
capital-formation activities.7  
Other states soon followed Kansas’s lead.8 By the time Congress 
passed the federal Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act), forty-seven of 
the forty-eight states as well as the then-territory of Hawaii had 
adopted blue sky laws.9  
The second significant historical fact is that when Congress passed 
the 1933 Act, there was no preemption of state authority over the 
registration of securities. Each state and the territory that at the time 
required the registration of securities continued to exercise that 
authority.10 Predominately, those blue sky regimes were based on a 
 
 4. 1911 Kan. Sess. Laws 210. See History, KAN. OFFICE OF SEC. COMM’R, http://www.ksc.ks.
gov/index.aspx?nid=154 [https://perma.cc/PW9L-6CVQ]. 
 5. See LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 7–8 (1958) (discussing the 
content and terms of the act). 
 6. Authors and scholars have offered interesting accounts of capital-formation activities 
before the advent of comprehensive securities legislation. See, e.g., JOHN CHAMBERLAIN, THE 
ENTERPRISING AMERICANS: A BUSINESS HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 130–32 (1961) 
(describing post-war sales of securities); JAMES S. MOFSKY, BLUE SKY RESTRICTIONS ON NEW 
BUSINESS PROMOTIONS 9–16 (1971) (describing promoter activities in connection with railroad 
construction).  
 7. See LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 2, at 58–60 (discussing early securities laws 
in Connecticut, Nevada, and Rhode Island). For an earlier version of this discussion, see LOSS & 
COWETT, supra note 5, at 5–7. 
 8. LOSS & COWETT, supra note 5, at 10 (reporting that within two years of the Kansas act, 
twenty-three states had adopted blue sky laws, and that “[a]ll but six of [those] acts were either 
identical with the Kansas statute or modeled upon it”). 
 9. See LOSS, SELIGMAN & PAREDES, supra note 2, at 65. The authors further report that 
“[t]oday all 50 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have 
blue sky laws in force.” Id. at 66. 
 10. It is not entirely clear that the U.S. Congress had authority to regulate capital formation 
in 1933. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 298 (1936) (discussing the scope of Congress’s 
commerce power, which “includes transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities 
between the citizens of the different states” as well as “embrac[ing] the instruments by which 
commerce is carried on”). In 1937, however, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
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qualification theory, not the disclosure theory that was at the heart of 
the 1933 Act.11 
This framework of federalism for the regulation of capital 
formation continued essentially unchanged for over half a century.12 
During that time period, an issuer that elected to do a national 
distribution of its securities had to meet the federal registration 
requirements imposed by the 1933 Act and the separate and individual 
registration requirements imposed by states, territories, and the 
District of Columbia.13  
Over the decades after the enactment of the 1933 Act, there were 
some efforts to deal with the burden imposed on capital formation by 
the obligation to meet the registration requirements and, in most cases, 
the qualification requirements of fifty-plus sovereign jurisdictions. For 
example, the Uniform Securities Act, some form of which was adopted 
by most states,14 provides for state registration by coordination.15 
Essentially, this coordination meant that an issuer could provide its 
federal filing package to states, and when the federal filing was 
declared effective, the state registrations also became effective.16 The 
Uniform Securities Act also provides for an exemption from state 
 
Steel Corp. made it clear that Congress has authority to regulate ordinary industry demonstrably 
connected to interstate commerce. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36 (1937).  
 11. Stated simply and generally, in a “qualification” or “merit” regime, an issuer offering 
securities must meet certain standards or conditions in connection with the offering. See, e.g., 
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 306(a)(2)(F) (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1956) 
(prohibiting excessive underwriting commissions). In a “disclosure” regime, the issuer is required 
to disclose prescribed investment information to investors. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012) (obligating 
issuers to disclose investment information to the Commission and investors). An exhaustive 
report by the ABA in 1986 concluded that some form of a merit regime was applicable in thirty-
nine states. ABA Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Sec. Comm., 
Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 BUS. LAW. 785, 788–89 (1986). In an 
article I wrote in 1997, I reviewed the registration provisions in a five-state sample and concluded 
that all five of the states applied some form of merit standards to registration. Rutheford B. 
Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption Failure, 22 J. CORP. L. 
175, 186 n.65 (1997). 
 12. In 1996, Congress enacted NSMIA, preempting some state authority over registration. 
See National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416.  
 13. See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text.  
 14. Approximately forty jurisdictions (thirty-seven states, two territories, and the District of 
Columbia) have “adopted or substantially adopted with modifications” the Uniform Securities 
Act. Jurisdictions Adopting the Uniform Securities Act, 2015 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 5500.  
 15. UNIF. SEC. ACT § 303. 
 16. Id. § 303(c) (stating that a registration statement “automatically becomes effective at the 
moment the federal registration statement becomes effective if all the following conditions are 
satisfied”). 
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registration for an issuer offering its securities that are traded on a 
national securities exchange.17  
The North American Securities Administrators Association 
(NASAA) over time also promulgated and offered to the states for 
adoption policies, protocols, and model rules and forms, some of which 
were designed to promote better cooperation and uniformity among 
the states regarding the blue sky rules governing capital formation.  
One example was the Uniform Limited Offering Exemption 
(ULOE),18 which was designed to provide a uniform state exemption 
from registration for offerings under federal Rule 50519 and Rule 506.20 
Two other examples of NASAA initiatives were the Small Company 
Offering Registration (SCOR) initiative,21 which is a protocol designed 
to provide a coordinated state registration of small offerings made 
under federal Rule 50422 or Regulation A,23 and a coordinated-equity-
review initiative, which is a protocol designed to coordinate state 
 
 17. The Act exempts from registration “any security listed or approved for listing upon 
notice of issuance on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, or the 
Midwest Stock Exchange.” Id. § 402(a)(8). 
 18. See SEC, REPORT ON THE UNIFORMITY OF STATE REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
OFFERINGS OF SECURITIES THAT ARE NOT “COVERED SECURITIES” (1997), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/uniformy.htm [https://perma.cc/U5KL-6BWJ] [hereinafter 
SEC UNIFORMITY REPORT]. 
 19. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505 (2015) (providing an exemption from federal registration 
requirements for offerings up to $5 million). On November 21, 2016 the Commission adopted an 
amendment to Rule 504 raising the maximum limit of an offering thereunder to $5 million. See 
Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, 81 Fed. Reg. 83,494 (Nov. 
21, 2016), Securities Act Release 33-10238 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230, 239, 240, 249, 
270, 275). In the same release the Commission repealed Rule 505, 17 C.F.R. § 230.505. 81 Fed. 
Reg. 83,553 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230). It also finalized amendments to Rule 147, 17  
C.F.R. § 230.147. 81 Fed. Reg. 83,550–51 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230). 
 20. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (providing an exemption from federal registration for offerings 
without regard to dollar amount).  
 21. NASAA’s website states:  
CR-SCOR provides for coordinated review of an offering of securities in two or more 
states located within a geographic group when the offering is intended to be made in 
reliance upon an exemption from registration with the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) under Rule 504 of SEC Regulation D or SEC Regulation A. 
Coordinated Review, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/
corporation-finance/coordinated-review [https://perma.cc/77EH-FRKL].  
 22. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504. The Commission has adopted an amendment to Rule 504 raising the 
maximum offering under that Rule to $5 million. See supra note 19.  
 23. Regulation A was enacted by the Commission under its delegated authority in the 1933 
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012). Regulation A (before the JOBS Act and its regulatory 
implementation by the Commission) was found at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.262 (2011). 
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review of initial public offerings that are the subject of federal 
registration.24  
Although the states broadly adopted these NASAA initiatives,25 
data and other available information show that the initiatives have 
been scantly utilized for the offering of securities. Consider, for 
example, the SCOR regime, which was adopted by the vast majority of 
states.26 In a 2000 article, I gathered information on the use of SCOR 
from a sample of ten states.27 The article reported that among the 
sample states, Iowa had four SCOR filings in the most recent three 
years; Indiana had two SCOR filings in a thirty-two month period;28 
Kansas had fifteen, six, and three SCOR filings in the most recent 
 
 24. NASAA’s website states: “CR-Equity provides a uniform procedure designed to 
coordinate the blue-sky registration process among states in which the issuer seeks to sell its 
equity securities.” Coordinated Review, supra note 21. Another website, sponsored by NASAA, 
states:  
CR-EQUITY provides a uniform procedure designed to coordinate the blue-sky 
registration process among states in which the issuer seeks to sell its equity 
securities. . . . CR-EQUITY offers issuers registration efficiencies by creating a 
uniform scheme of review. . . . CR-EQUITY simplifies the process for resolution of 
issues raised during review of the registration application. . . . Finally, CR-EQUITY 
offers issuers expedited review. . . . CR-EQUITY generally is intended only for initial 
public offerings of common stock, preferred stock, warrants, rights and units comprised 
of equity securities.  
CR-Equity Overview, COORDINATED REVIEW, http://www.coordinatedreview.org/cr-equity/
overview [https://perma.cc/Q7RG-J7ED].  
 25. It is reported, for example, that the CR-Equity protocol has been adopted by all but two 
jurisdictions. See COORDINATED REVIEW, supra note 24 (“Of the jurisdictions that register 
offerings eligible to use CR-EQUITY, all but two currently are participating in the program.”). 
Regarding the adoption of ULOE by states, a 1997 SEC report to Congress stated that 
“[a]pproximately 30 states have adopted ULOE to some extent.” SEC UNIFORMITY REPORT, 
supra note 18. A later sample of ten states indicated that nine of the ten states sampled had 
adopted some form of ULOE. Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Insidious Remnants of State Rules 
Respecting Capital Formation, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 407, 419 n.45 (2000). Regarding the adoption of 
the CR-SCOR protocol, as of 1996, NASAA reported forty-three jurisdictions had adopted 
SCOR or Form U-7. N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, State Adoptions of Small Corporate Offerings 
Registration Program and Form U-7, 6-2001 NASAA Rep. (CCH) ¶ 267. 
 26. As of 2015, approximately forty-five jurisdictions (forty-three states, Puerto Rico, and 
the District of Columbia) have adopted SCOR or informally accept SCOR filings. Small 
Corporate Offering Registration Program and Form U-7, 2015 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 6461. 
 27. Campbell, supra note 25, at 424. In evaluating the use of SCOR, it is good to remember 
that there are more than five million small businesses (businesses with fewer than twenty 
employees) in the United States. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY: A 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 99–100 tbl.A6 (2009) (providing data for the year 2006). 
 28. Campbell, supra note 25, at 424.  
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years; and Michigan had a total of twelve SCOR filings over a three-
year period.29  
I updated the data in 2015, and those data show that SCOR 
registrations are now virtually unused. Currently, SCOR registrations 
involving multiple states can be coordinated by a single filing 
(Coordinated Review-Small Company Offering Registration or CR-
SCOR) within four designated geographic areas. SCOR filings can also 
be made directly with a single state or multiple states. The totals of all 
CR-SCOR registrations in all regions were three in 2012, five in 2013, 
and one in 2014.30 In addition, the total of uncoordinated SCOR filings 
in the nine sample states (I was unable to get data from one sample 
state) was four in 2012, four in 2013, and one in 2014.31  
 
 29. Id. at 424–25 n.82. 
 30. E-mail from Joy Sakamoto-Wengel, Assistant Attorney Gen., Md. Div. of Sec., Atl. CR-
SCOR Region, to Molly Coffey, Student, Univ. Ky. Coll. of Law (Nov. 20, 2015, 15:10 EST) (on 
file with the Duke Law Journal); Telephone Interview with Lynn Hammes, Dir., Fin. & Admin., 
Kan. Sec’y Comm’rs Office, Midwest CR-SCOR Region (Nov. 19, 2015); Telephone Interview 
with Patricia Loutherback, Dir., Registration Div., Tex. State Sec. Bd., Southwest CR-SCOR 
Region (Nov. 19, 2015); Telephone Interview with Sarah Reynolds, Div. of Sec., Wash. State 
Dep’t of Fin. Insts., West CR-SCOR Region (Nov. 19, 2015). 
 31. SCOR filings can now occur through coordinated filing or filing directly in individual 
states that have adopted the SCOR filing regime. Out of the ten sample states, Indiana, Kansas, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, and Maryland had zero SCOR filings in 2012, 2013, and 2014. I 
obtained this information through emails from state securities registration employees to my 
research assistant, and through telephone conversations with their enforcement staff. See E-mail 
from Joy Sakamoto-Wengel, Assistant Attorney Gen., Md. Div. of Sec., to Molly Coffey, Student, 
Univ. Ky. Coll. of Law (Nov. 19, 2015, 06:35 EST) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); E-mail 
from Patrick Sanders, Registrations Attorney, Ind. Sec. Div., to Molly Coffey, Student, Univ. Ky. 
Coll. of Law (Jan. 13, 2016, 09:12 EST) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); E-mail from Steven 
Wassom, Exec. Dir., Kan. Sec. Comm’r Office, to Molly Coffey, Student, Univ. Ky. Coll. of Law 
(Dec. 23, 2015, 12:05 EST) (on file with the Duke Law Journal); Telephone Interview with 
Anthony Murphy, Registration Branch Manager, Div. of Sec., Ky. Dep’t of Fin. Inst. (Jan. 6, 
2016); Telephone Interview with Len Riviere, Deputy Chief Exam’r, Sec. Div., La. Office of Fin. 
Inst. (Dec. 28, 2015); Telephone Interview with Paige Turney, Assistant Sec. Adm’r, Office of 
Sec., Me. Dep’t of Prof’l and Fin. Regulation (Dec. 28, 2015). Iowa and Michigan both had one 
filing in 2013 but zero in 2012 and 2014. E-mail from Mich. Dep’t of Licensing and Regulatory 
Affairs (LARA), to Molly Coffey, Student, Univ. Ky. Coll. of Law (Jan. 13, 2016, 17:54 CST) (on 
file with the Duke Law Journal); Telephone Interview with Tom Alberts, Dir., Corp. Fin., Iowa 
Sec. Bureau (Dec. 22, 2015). Illinois had the most SCOR filings, with two in 2012, two in 2013, 
and one in 2014. E-mail from David Finnigan, Senior Enf’t Attorney, Ill. Sec. Dep’t, to author 
(Dec. 22, 2015, 11:58 EST) (on file with the Duke Law Journal). A 2012 GAO report is generally 
consistent with the foregoing, although the report unfortunately is not based on any hard data. 
The report states that “[t]he efficacy of the efforts to streamline the state registration process is 
unknown.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION: 
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS 15 (2012), 
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Similarly, NASAA’s coordinated-equity-review program is little 
used. In 1997, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
Commission) reported that there had to that date been only two 
coordinated equity reviews.32 My 2000 article reported that by late 
1999, only seventeen offerings pursuant to a coordinated equity review 
had become effective.33 More recent data show the continued, 
extremely modest use of coordinated equity reviews. The Pennsylvania 
Securities Commission, which coordinates the program, reported that 
only one coordinated equity review was filed between 2012 and 2014.34  
B. The Fight over Preemption 
Starting in the mid-1980s, scholars35 and ultimately Congress 
focused on the problems wrought by the fact that each state and the 
federal government had a different and independent set of rules 
governing capital formation. This led to the introduction of the Capital 
Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995,36 which with 
significant changes was enacted into law in 1996 as NSMIA.37 In 
NSMIA, Congress, for the first time since the passage of the 1933 Act, 
preempted some state registration authority. 
It was clear in 1996 that Congress if it so chose could preempt state 
authority over the registration of securities.38 What Congress finally 
enacted in NSMIA, however, was far short of complete preemption of 
 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/592113.pdf [https://perma.cc/XDB6-GMTF]. The report continues 
as follows:  
According to several of the state securities administrators whom we interviewed, they 
have not participated in regional reviews or used SCOR forms for Regulation A filings 
because there have been so few Regulation A filings in their state. Similarly, a 
researcher and securities attorneys with whom we met noted that some of these 
methods, like SCOR, have not been widely used because of the low number of 
Regulation A filings in recent years.  
Id. 
 32. SEC UNIFORMITY REPORT, supra note 18, at Part III.B.1.a.ii(A). 
 33. Campbell, supra note 25, at 426. 
 34. Telephone Interview with Brett Warren, Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin., Pa. Dep’t of 
Banking & Sec. (Dec. 28, 2015). 
 35. See generally Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky 
Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553 (1985) [hereinafter Campbell, Open Attack] (discussing the impact 
on capital formation of state requirements regarding registration, merit qualification, regulation 
of brokers and dealers, and antifraud provisions).  
 36. H.R. 2131, 104th Cong. (1995). 
 37. National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 
3416. 
 38. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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states’ registration authority. Briefly stated, NSMIA preempted state 
authority in three areas: offerings of securities by mutual funds,39 
offerings by companies traded on a national securities exchange,40 and 
exempt offerings under Rule 506.41 NSMIA also delegated authority to 
the Commission to expand preemption by regulation.42 
The debates and adoption process leading to the 1996 enactment 
of NSMIA turned out to be a precursor of the future relationship 
between state and federal regulators.  
In the legislative hearings leading to NSMIA, for example, the 
state regulators offered vigorous testimony against preemption,43 and 
their effective lobby seems certain to have influenced the congressional 
committee considering NSMIA and ultimately Congress to limit 
significantly the broader legislative preemption provision initially 
proposed in the Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization 
Act.44 The Commission, on the other hand, refused in its committee 
testimony to endorse preemption.45  
Over the nearly three decades that followed, the Commission 
failed in any meaningful fashion to expand preemption, 
 
 39. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(2) (2012) (preempting state registration authority of “a security issued 
by an investment company that is registered . . . under the Investment Company Act of 1940”). 
 40. Id. § 77r(b)(1)(B) (preempting state registration authority over a security “listed, or 
authorized for listing, on a national securities exchange”). 
 41. Id. § 77r(b)(4) (preempting state registration authority over a security “with respect to a 
transaction that is exempt from registration . . . pursuant to . . . Commission rules or regulations 
issued under section 77(d)2”). 
 42. Id. § 77r(b)(3) (preempting state registration authority over the “offer or sale of the 
security to qualified purchasers, as defined by the Commission by rule”); see infra notes 46–51 
and accompanying text. 
 43. See, e.g., Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995: Hearings on H.R. 
2131 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong. 
307 (1995) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 2131] (statement of Dee R. Harris, President, North 
American Securities Administrators Association) (“NASAA is opposed to the preemption of the 
state authority to register and review securities offerings.”). 
 44. As originally proposed, the Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 
1995, H.R. 2131, 104th Cong. (1995), preempted state registration authority over securities issued 
pursuant to a section 3(b) exemption under the Securities Act of 1933. If that provision had been 
adopted, states would have lost registration authority over offerings under Regulation A, Rule 
504, and Rule 505. 
 45. See Hearings on H.R. 2131, supra note 43, at 105 (statement of Arthur Levitt, Chairman, 
Securities and Exchange Commission).  
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notwithstanding a broad delegation of authority in NSMIA to the 
Commission to expand preemption through regulation.46  
NSMIA permitted the Commission to preempt by regulation state 
registration authority over any offering “to qualified purchasers, as 
defined by the Commission by rule.”47 The breadth of this delegation 
is made clear on the face of the legislation, which limits the 
Commission’s authority to define “qualified purchaser” only by 
requiring that the definition must be “consistent with the public 
interest and the protection of investors.”48 Regarding the “public 
interest” limitation, the legislation provides that when in the enactment 
of regulations the Commission is required to act in the “public interest, 
the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of 
investors, whether the action promotes efficiency, competition, and 
capital formation.”49 
The Commission never used this delegated authority to expand 
preemption, notwithstanding the apparent inefficiency of a registration 
regime that may impose fifty-plus separate registration statutes on a 
company that engages in a broad solicitation for external capital and 
the overwhelming evidence that state authority over registration had 
wrecked both Regulation A offerings50 and Regulation D offerings.51  
Although the Commission was unwilling to advocate on behalf of 
preemption or expand preemption by regulation, the antipreemption 
 
 46. The Commission did, however, expand the preemption regarding the offer and sale of 
securities traded on a national exchange by defining securities traded on the Pacific Exchange as 
“covered securities” preempted from state registration authority. Covered Securities Pursuant to 
Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. pt. 230, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7494, 66 
S.E.C. Docket 583 (Jan. 2, 1998). In 2001 the Commission proposed to define “qualified 
purchaser” as “any accredited investor” under Regulation D. Defining the Term “Qualified 
Purchaser” Under the Securities Act of 1933, 66 Fed. Reg. 66,839 (proposed Dec. 27, 2001). The 
Commission failed to adopt this proposal. 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3).  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. § 77b(b). 
 50. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses’ Search for “a Moderate 
Capital,” 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 106–12 (2006). Prior to the Commission’s most recent 
amendments, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263 (2015), Regulation A provided an exemption from 
federal regulation requirements for offerings up to $5 million, predicated on disclosure of 
prescribed investment information. Issuers had abandoned the use of this exemption, due largely 
to state registration requirements. See Campbell, supra, at 110–12. 
 51. See generally Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The Wreck of Regulation D: The Unintended 
(and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC’s Crown Jewel Exemptions, 66 BUS. LAW. 919 (2011) (describing 
how state authority over registration created problems with Regulation D and providing remedial 
actions for the problems). 
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forces under the leadership of state regulators and NASAA continued 
to wage an aggressive and imaginative campaign against preemption.  
For example, an exposure draft52 of the Dodd-Frank Act,53 which 
was to be the blueprint for dealing with the Wall Street failures seen as 
the cause of the recession of 2008, had a provision buried deep in the 
roughly 1,200 pages of the proposed legislation that would have 
repealed the preemption of state registration authority over Rule 506 
offerings.54 The provision was not part of the final Dodd-Frank Act.  
NASAA also established a website designed to coordinate better 
the efforts to limit and roll back preemption of state authority over 
registration.55  
But perhaps the most aggressive initiative against any expansion 
of preemption occurred in connection with the regulatory 
implementation of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS 
Act).56  
Title IV of the JOBS Act57 is the basis for the new Regulation A+ 
rules.58 The Act delegates to the Commission the authority to preempt 
by regulation state registration authority over Regulation A+ offerings, 
provided the securities in the offerings are offered or sold to a 
“qualified purchaser.”59  
State regulators and antipreemption forces fought this perceived 
threat to state registration authority on multiple fronts. State 
 
 52. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 111TH CONG., 
RESTORING AMERICAN FINANCIAL STABILITY ACT OF 2009 (Comm. Print 2009) (introduced by 
Sen. Chris Dodd). 
 53. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified in scattered titles of the U.S. Code). 
 54. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUS., AND URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 52, at 680–
81 (referencing § 928, which aimed to give state regulators authority over Regulation D offerings). 
 55. NASAA Preemption Resource Center, N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, http://www.nasaa.
org/issues-and-advocacy/nasaa-preemption-resource-center/#Challenges to State Regulatory 
Authority [https://perma.cc/U8SP-MAMK]. 
 56. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-206, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 57. Id. §§ 401–402, 126 Stat. at 323–25. 
 58. Id. § 401, 126 Stat. at 324 (giving the Commission the authority “by rule or  
regulation [to] add a class of securities to the securities exempted pursuant to this section”  
under § 401(b)(2)). The new Regulation A+ Rules, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263 (2016), provide an 
exemption from federal registration requirements for offerings by companies that are not subject 
to the reporting requirements of the 1934 Act. The limit on the offering is $50 million and is 
predicated on the company providing investment information to investors. Id. 
 59. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (2012).  
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regulators wrote numerous letters of comment on the proposed 
regulations, strongly urging the Commission against any significant 
regulatory preemption of state authority over Regulation A+ 
offerings.60 U.S. senators and representatives were convinced to write 
letters directly to the chair of the Commission, urging her to eschew or 
limit any preemption of state registration authority.61 Finally, after the 
Commission issued its final rules under the new Regulation A+ 
preempting state registration authority over larger, Tier 2 Regulation 
A+ offerings, state regulators unleashed a new tactic: suing the 
Commission and claiming that the Commission exceeded its delegated 
authority by expanding preemption to cover Tier 2 offerings under the 
new Regulation A+.62  
The strategies and roles of the Commission and state regulators 
that were first established in the context of NSMIA, therefore, 
continue to this day, and this relationship seems unlikely to change. It 
is a relationship that has been important in defining today’s rules 
governing capital formation and that will continue to be important in 
defining society’s rules in the future. State regulators have vigorously 
and seemingly with renewed energy opposed the expansion of 
preemption. The Commission, on the other hand, has been unwilling 
to any significant degree to promote preemption.63  
 
 60. Amendments to Regulation A, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9741, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 
21,857–58, 21,857 n. 772 (Apr. 20, 2015). 
 61. See id. (citing letters written by U.S. senators and representatives as “object[ing] to the 
preemption of state securities law registration and qualification requirements” in an Exchange 
Act Release).  
 62. See Petition for Review at 1–2, Galvin v. SEC, No. 15-1150 (D.C. Cir. May 22, 2015), 
consolidated with Lindeen v. SEC, 825 F.3d 646 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (No. 15-1149) (filing a petition 
“relating to the preemption of state securities law registration and qualification requirements for 
certain Regulation A securities,” and asking for a permanent injunction on the basis that the rules 
are “arbitrary, [and] capricious”); see also Opening Brief of Petitioners Monica J. Lindeen and 
William F. Galvin at 54–55, Lindeen, 825 F.3d 646 (No. 15-1149). The court has now rendered its 
opinion, holding that the Commission did not exceed its delegated authority in preempting state 
registration authority over Tier 2 offerings under Regulation A+. Lindeen, 825 F.3d at 656–58. 
 63. See supra notes 45–54 and accompanying text. The only exception to this unwillingness 
is the Commission’s preemption of state authority over Tier 2 Regulation A+ offerings.  
17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (2015). The Commission correctly perceived that it was under pressure from 
Congress to do something about preemption over Regulation A+ offerings because it was the 
second time Congress had delegated similar authority to the Commission to expand preemption 
through regulation. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (preempting state registration authority over the 
“offer or sale of the security to qualified purchasers, as defined by the Commission by rule”). The 
Commission’s regulatory preemption in its Regulation A+ rules is modest, however, only 
preempting state authority over Tier 2 offerings and leaving Tier 1 offerings—a regulatory regime 
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II.  THE ROLE OF TODAY’S BLUE SKY LAWS 
Blue sky laws have an important role in the governance of capital 
formation. States generally retain authority to make and enforce 
antifraud rules. States also retain significant authority over 
registration, although as a result of preemption, states have in recent 
years lost some authority in this area.  
A. States’ Authority to Enact and Enforce Antifraud Rules  
Today, states generally retain authority to enact and enforce their 
own antifraud rules. NSMIA specifically preserves these rights for 
states,64 and states’ securities laws typically have strong antifraud rules 
that are similar to federal antifraud rules.65 Stated broadly, these state 
antifraud provisions prohibit issuers soliciting external capital from 
making material misstatements and require those issuers to disclose all 
material facts.66  
A violation of state antifraud rules by an issuer generates the risk 
of substantial state-based economic penalties imposed on the issuer in 
 
crafted for smaller Regulation A+ offerings—subject to state registration authority. This 
preemption is unlikely to have any material impact on capital formation, since Tier 2 offerings 
appear to be an unattractive way to raise capital. See infra notes 103–05 and accompanying text. 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1) (preempting some state authority only over “registration or 
qualification”); id. § 77r(c)(1) (“[A]ny State shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such State 
to investigate and bring enforcement actions, in connection with securities or securities 
transactions . . . (A) with respect to—(i) fraud or deceit . . . .”).  
 65. For example, section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act makes it 
unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, sale, or purchase of any security, 
directly or indirectly 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,  
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material 
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the 
circumstances under which they are made, not misleading, or  
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person. 
UNIF. SEC. ACT § 101 (NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS 1956). 
 66. See, e.g., id. 
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the form of investors’ private rights of recovery,67 as well as 
administrative68 and criminal sanctions.69  
These private and governmental state sanctions, therefore, 
amount to a significant role for blue sky laws. State antifraud 
provisions increase issuers’ costs of committing fraud in connection 
with their capital-raising efforts and thus incentivize issuers to provide 
investors with an efficient level of complete and accurate investment 
information. These state antifraud provisions can both raise the 
amount of the penalty and, perhaps even more importantly, raise the 
probability of detection and prosecution of the miscreant.70 This latter 
effect—raising the probability of detection and prosecution—depends 
to a significant degree on the state’s willingness to invest its own 
resources in the enforcement of its antifraud rules.  
B. States’ Authority over Registration 
As suggested in Part I, states’ securities registration role today is 
complex. It therefore requires a more extensive explanation than what 
was offered in regard to states’ antifraud authority.  
To date, there has been a partial preemption of state authority 
over registration. This preemption started with NSMIA and was 
recently expanded in the JOBS Act and its final regulations. 
 
 67. Section 410 of the Uniform Securities Act expressly provides a private right of action 
against one that offers or sells securities through “any untrue statement of a material fact.”  
Id. § 410. That provision bears close resemblance to section 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act. Compare  
15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (providing a cause of action when one offers or sells securities “by  
means . . . which include[] an untrue statement of a material fact”), with UNIF. SEC. ACT § 410 
(providing a cause of action when one “offers or sells a security by means of any untrue  
statement of a material fact”). The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA),  
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) and 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b), has had some impact on private rights of recovery 
under state antifraud provisions. SLUSA preempts the authority of state courts over some private 
actions filed under state antifraud provisions. See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f); id. § 77p(b). The 
preemption generally applies only to class actions involving the securities of companies traded on 
a national exchange. See generally DONNA N. NAGY, RICHARD W. PAINTER & MARGARET V. 
SACHS, SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 445–57 (3d ed. 
2011). 
 68. Section 408 of the Uniform Securities Act expressly authorizes state administrators to 
institute injunction actions against those violating the provisions of the Act. UNIF. SEC.  
ACT § 408.  
 69. Section 409 of the Uniform Securities Act expressly authorizes criminal penalties, 
including imprisonment, for the “willful[]” violation of its provisions. Id. § 409.  
 70. See infra notes 115–18 and accompanying text. 
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The most significant preemption by NSMIA was the preemption 
of state registration authority over Rule 506 offerings.71 That 
preemption eliminated state registration authority over thousands of 
offerings by issuers each year. For example, data that I developed show 
that over a twenty-five-month period during 2008–2010, there were 
more than 25,000 Rule 506 offerings.72 More recent data developed by 
Professor Manning Warren show a total of 32,166 Rule 506 offerings 
over a later eighteen-month period.73  
NSMIA also preempted state registration authority over offerings 
by companies with exchange-traded securities.74 While preempting 
state registration authority over offerings by such companies is 
apparently significant since it preempts state registration authority 
over most larger publicly traded issuers,75 NSMIA changed less in that 
regard than may at first appear. That is because prior to the effective 
date of NSMIA, most blue sky laws had an exemption from state 
registration for offerings by these companies.76  
The JOBS Act in 2012 generated two other preemptions of state 
authority over registration. First, the statute itself preempts state 
registration authority over offerings under the newly implemented 
crowdfunding exemption.77 Under this exemption, as implemented by 
the final Commission rules,78 companies not subject to the periodic 
 
 71. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (preempting state registration authority over the issuance of a 
security “with respect to a transaction that is exempt from registration . . . pursuant 
to . . . (F) Commission rules or regulations issued under section 77d(2)”).  
 72. Campbell, The Wreck of Regulation D, supra note 51, at 926 tbl.I. 
 73. Manning Gilbert Warren III, The False Promise of Publicly Offered Private Placements, 
68 SMU L. REV. 899, 905 tbl.1 (2015). 
 74. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A)–(B). NSMIA also preempts state registration authority over 
securities issued by registered investment companies. Id. § 77r(b)(2). 
 75. There are currently, for example, approximately 3,137 companies listed on NASDAQ, 
3,168 listed on NYSE, and 366 listed on the AMEX. See Company List (NASDAQ, NYSE, & 
AMEX), NASDAQ, http://www.nasdaq.com/screening/company-list.aspx [http://perma.cc/F8YN
-DD2N]. 
 76. Exchange Exemptions, 2016 BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) ¶ 6401 (listing forty-six states as 
having exchange-traded exemptions from state registration). 
 77. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6); id. § 77d-1. The crowdfunding proposal generated a significant 
amount of scholarship and comment. See generally Joan MacLeod Heminway, Crowdfunding and 
the Public/Private Divide in U.S. Securities Regulation, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 477 (2014) (discussing 
the impact of crowdfunding on securities regulation in the United States); Joan MacLeod 
Heminway, How Congress Killed Investment Crowdfunding: A Tale of Political Pressure, Hasty 
Decisions, and Inept Judgments that Begs for a Happy Ending, 102 KY. L.J. 865 (2014) (same). 
 78. See Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 
200).  
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reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 193479 (the 
1934 Act) can sell up to $1 million in securities during a twelve-month 
period.80 Investors are limited as to how much each may purchase.81 
The offering must be conducted exclusively through the website of an 
intermediary (a broker or a “funding portal”),82 and the issuer is strictly 
limited regarding any advertising of the offering.83 The issuer is 
required to file with the Commission and disclose investment 
information both at the time of the offering (ex ante disclosures)84 and 
on a periodic basis following the offering (ex post disclosures).85  
The JOBS Act, as implemented by the final Commission rules,86 
also preempts state registration authority over some offerings under 
the new Regulation A+ rules. The new Regulation A+ rules87 provide 
an exemption from registration that is built on the same structure as 
the pre-JOBS Act Regulation A exemption. Thus the Regulation A+ 
exemption requires the issuer to file with the Commission and disclose 
to investors a significant amount of investment information both ex 
ante88 and ex post.89 The amount of investment information is scaled, 
depending on the size of the offering. More information is required in 
Tier 2 offerings (offerings of up to $50 million) than is required in Tier 
1 offerings (offerings of up to $20 million).90 The Regulation A+ 
exemption is not available to issuers subject to the reporting 
requirements of the 1934 Act.91  
 
 79. 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(b)(2) (2015) (exemption is unavailable for sales by issuers “subject 
to the requirement to file reports pursuant to section 13 or section 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934”). 
 80. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(A). 
 81. Id. § 77d(a)(6)(B); 17 C.F.R. § 227.204. 
 82. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6)(C). 
 83. Id. § 77d-1(b)(2). 
 84. 17 C.F.R. §§ 227.201, 227.203. 
 85. Id. §§ 227.202–.203. 
 86. Amendments to Regulation A, Exchange Act Release No. 33-9741, 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806 
(Apr. 20, 2015). 
 87. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263. 
 88. Id. § 230.251(d). 
 89. Id. § 230.257(d). 
 90. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (comparing Form 1-A, Part F/S(b), financial statements 
required for Tier 1 offerings, with Part F/S(c), financial statements required for Tier 2 offerings).  
 91. Id. § 230.251(a) (stating that the exemption is only available to offerings by an issuer “not 
subject to section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934”). 
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The statute authorizing Regulation A+ delegated to the 
Commission authority to preempt state registration authority.92 In its 
final rules, the Commission chose to preempt state registration 
authority over Tier 2 offerings (offerings up to $50 million) but not 
over Tier 1 offerings (offerings up to $20 million).93  
As noted above, shortly after the final Regulation A+ rules were 
published, a suit was filed that petitioned the court for a permanent 
injunction against the Commission’s rules regarding preemption.94 The 
bases for the petition included a claim that the Commission exceeded 
its delegated authority by preempting state registration authority over 
Tier 2 offerings.95 In a recent opinion, the D.C. Circuit rejected that 
argument, holding that the Commission’s rule preempting state 
registration authority over Tier 2 offerings was within the 
congressional delegation of power to the Commission.96  
In summary, state authority over registration has been eliminated 
with respect to: (1) offerings under Rule 506 (now including public 
offerings, if purchasers are limited to “accredited investors”97); (2) 
 
 92. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (2012). That section preempts state registration authority over  
[a] security . . . with respect to a transaction that is exempt from 
registration . . . pursuant to . . . a rule or regulation adopted pursuant to section 
77c(b)(2) of this title and such security is . . . offered or sold to a qualified purchaser, as 
defined by the Commission pursuant to paragraph (3) with respect to that purchase or 
sale. 
Id. The reference to “paragraph (3)” above is a reference to part of the original NSMIA, and that 
paragraph, after authorizing the Commission to preempt by regulation state registration 
authority, goes on to state, “In prescribing such rule, the Commission may define the term 
‘qualified purchaser’ differently with respect to different categories of securities, consistent with 
the public interest and the protection of investors.” Id. § 77r(b)(3). When the Commission is 
engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider whether an action is “in the public interest, the 
Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will 
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.” Id. § 77b(b). 
 93. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act 
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,899 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.256) 
(defining a “qualified purchaser” as “any person to whom securities are offered or sold in a Tier 
2 offering [of Regulation A]”). As originally proposed, Rule 256 defined a “qualified purchaser” 
as “any offeree of such [Regulation A+] security and, in a Tier 2 offering, any purchaser of such 
security.” Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under 
Section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 79 Fed. Reg. 3926, 4003 (proposed Dec. 18, 2013) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.256).  
 94. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 95. See supra note 62. 
 96. Lindeen v. SEC, 825 F.3d 646, 656–58 (D.C. Cir. 2016). 
 97. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in 
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,804 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)). 
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offerings by issuers of its securities that are traded on a national 
exchange; (3) Tier 2 Regulation A+ offerings; and (4) crowdfunding 
offerings of up to $1 million offered only over the Internet.98  
Essentially all other securities offerings by issuers are subject to 
state registration requirements. These include: (1) registered offerings 
by issuers of securities that are not traded on a national exchange;  
(2) private placements under the common law of section 4(a)(2); (3) 
offerings under Rule 504;99 (4) offerings under Rule 505;100 (5) Tier 1 
offerings under Regulation A+; and (6) intrastate offerings under Rule 
147.  
As a result, although the scope of state authority has to some 
degree been constricted by preemption, blue sky laws continue to play 
a significant role in capital formation with regard to registration 
obligations. This appears to be most particularly true in connection 
with small-business capital formation, since the types of offerings listed 
in the immediately preceding paragraph appear attractive to and, 
indeed, are generally designed to accommodate the needs of small 
businesses.  
Practically, however, state registration authority over small-
business capital formation has been further reduced as a result of small 
issuers abandoning capital-formation strategies that are subject to state 
registration authority.  
For example, at the time the JOBS Act was passed, states 
exercised registration authority over Regulation A offerings. Issuers, 
however, had essentially abandoned Regulation A as a vehicle for 
capital formation.101  
 
 98. The extent to which crowdfunding will be widely—and effectively—used is still a 
mystery. Certainly it has attracted enormous interest, suggesting that it will be widely used by 
small issuers. But it has challenges. There are significant ex ante and ex post disclosure 
requirements. It also appears that the strict limitation on issuer advertising will require issuers 
using crowdfunding to forego more traditional solicitations. See supra notes 81–85 and 
accompanying text.  
 99. The Commission has adopted an amendment raising the maximum limit of a Rule 504 
offering to $5 million. See supra note 19.  
 100. The Commission has adopted an amendment repealing Rule 505. See supra note 19.  
 101. See Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The New Regulation of Small Business Capital 
Formation: The Impact—if Any—of the JOBS Act, 102 KY. L.J. 815, 822 tbl.II (2014) (showing 
that the average annual number of Regulation A filings from 1995 through 2004 was 7.8 and from 
2005 through 2011 was 23.1). 
CAMPBELL IN PRINTER FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/28/2016  2:46 PM 
624  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 66:605 
 
Under the new Regulation A+ rules, states will continue to 
exercise registration authority over Tier 1 Regulation A+ offerings.102 
It is unlikely, however, that Tier 1 Regulation A+ offerings will attract 
much usage from issuers, because the requirements for a Tier 1 
Regulation A+ offering are remarkably similar to the requirements for 
a pre-JOBS Act Regulation A offering.103  
Preliminary data support the assumption that there will be very 
few smaller, Tier 1 offerings under Regulation A+. For example, 
between the effective date of Regulation A+ (June 19, 2015) and May 
24, 2016, there were only thirty-seven Tier 1 Regulation A+ offerings 
filed with the Commission.104 During that same period there also were 
twenty-five Tier 2 offerings of $20 million or less filed with the 
Commission, a range within which issuers could have relied on Tier 1 
rules.105  
Similarly, data demonstrate that small offerings under Regulation 
D have largely abandoned Rule 504 and Rule 505—offerings that are 
subject to state registration authority—in favor of Rule 506 offerings, 
in which state authority over registration is preempted.106 Data from a 
twenty-five-month period before the JOBS Act was enacted show that 
approximately 79 percent of all Regulation D offerings of $1 million or 
less—offerings that were within the size limit for a Rule 504  
offering—were instead made under the more demanding requirements 
 
 102. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
 103. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. 
 104. Regulation A+ data were obtained from the subscription-only Lexis Securities Mosaic 
website. See Form 1-A Data, LEXIS SEC. MOSAIC, www.lexissecuritiesmosaic.com 
[https://perma.cc/YB43-NPJH] (click “SEC Filings” tab; then follow “SEC Filings” hyperlink; 
then search “Form 1-A”). Following the passage of the JOBS Act, NASAA adopted a new 
coordinated-review regime for offerings under Regulation A+. N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, 
NASAA COORDINATED REVIEW OF REGULATION A OFFERINGS REVIEW PROTOCOL (2014), 
http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/NASAA-Regulation-A-Review-Protocol-
final-Adopted-March-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/48FR-AD3G]. NASAA reported that the regime 
was adopted by forty-nine of its fifty-three members. Amendments to Regulation A, 80 Fed. Reg. 
21,806, 21,861 n. 826 (Apr. 20, 2015). As of June 2, 2016, only ten coordinated reviews for Tier 1 
offerings had been filed with the states. E-mail from Faith L. Anderson, Esq., Chief of 
Registration & Regulatory Affairs, Wash. Dep’t of Fin. Insts. Sec. Div., to author (June 2, 2016, 
17:17 EST) (on file with author). 
 105. See Form 1-A Data, LEXIS SEC. MOSAIC, supra note 104. 
 106. To capture the full benefits of a Rule 506 offering, issuers in these small offerings 
overwhelmingly limit them to “accredited investors.” See Campbell, supra note 51, at 930 tbl.VII 
(noting that 88.3 percent of Rule 506 offerings of $1 million or less were limited to “accredited 
investors” and 9l.8 percent of Rule 506 offerings of $1 million to $5 million were limited to 
“accredited investors”). 
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of Rule 506.107 Approximately 92 percent of offerings of $1 million to 
$5 million—offerings that were within the size limit of Rule 505—were 
moved to a Rule 506 offering.108  
Data from Professor Manning Warren show that more recently 
only about 1.3 percent of all Regulation D offerings are made pursuant 
to Rule 504, and only about 2.5 percent of Regulation D offerings are 
made pursuant to Rule 505.109 Other data show, however, that 
approximately 55 percent of all Regulation D offerings are within a size 
range that would qualify for a Rule 504 or Rule 505 offering.110 
A recent Commission proposal regarding the intrastate exemption 
of Rule 147111 may also generate some migration from, or at least 
diminished use of, offerings under that exemption. The Commission’s 
proposal relaxes the requirements for Rule 147 offerings,112 which 
would seem to encourage the use of this federal exemption over which 
the states still retain registration authority. The proposal, however, 
imposes a new requirement for the federal exemption.  
Under the proposal, the federal exemption under Rule 147 
requires the offering to either be registered under the state’s blue sky 
laws or meet the requirements for the particular state’s crowdfunding 
exemption from registration.113 If adopted, the practical effect of this 
new requirement will be that issuers are no longer able to coordinate a 
Rule 147 offering with, for example, a state small-offering 
exemption.114 The irony here is that the proposed amendments to Rule 
 
 107. Id. at 928 tbl.III. 
 108. Id. at 928 tbl.IV. 
 109. Warren, supra note 73, at 903 fig.1 (analyzing 450 Rule 504 offerings and 824 Rule 505 
offerings out of a total of 34,199 Regulation D offerings in the sample). 
 110. See Campbell, supra note 51, at 927 (“[A]pproximately 55 percent of the Regulation D 
offerings in our 27,000 sample were for amounts of $5 million or less.”).  
 111. Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, 80 Fed. Reg. 
69,786 (proposed Oct. 30, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230).  
 112. Id. at 69,831–32 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c) (relaxing the “doing business” 
requirement). 
 113. Id. at 69,831–32 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(a)). Registration of the offering 
under blue sky laws seems unlikely, due to the expense of state registration.  
 114. On November 21, 2016, the Commission adopted final amendments to Rule 147. 
Exemptions to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 
33-10328, 81 Fed. Reg. 83,494 (Nov. 21, 2016) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 230, 239, 240, 
249, 270, 275). The amendments are to be effective on April 20, 2017. Id. at 83,494. The final 
amendments omit any requirement that the Rule 147 offering be registered with the state  
or compliant with the state’s crowdfunding exemption. Id. at 83,550–51 (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. § 230.147). 
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147, which are seemingly designed to enhance the significance of and 
reliance on state registration authority to protect investors, may 
actually drive a portion of these offerings into other types of offerings 
that preempt state registration authority.  
Thus, although small issuers—as opposed to larger companies 
with large capital needs—are most likely to be subject to state 
registration authority, one must realize that these small businesses 
have to a degree abandoned capital-formation strategies that are 
subject to state registration authority. 
*   *   * 
Today, blue sky laws continue to play a significant role in 
governing capital formation. States invariably have laws that prohibit 
fraud in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. States also 
exercise some authority over registration of securities, although that 
authority has been diminished somewhat by federal statutory 
preemption. Data also show that small businesses often deal with state 
registration by restructuring their transactions to meet the 
requirements for a federal exemption that preempts state registration 
authority. 
III.  THE EFFICIENCY OF TODAY’S BLUE SKY LAWS  
Although progress has been slow and somewhat messy, today’s 
blue sky laws are considerably more efficient than in prior periods. 
Regulatory efficiency can be further enhanced, however, by states 
focusing additional attention and resources on the enforcement of their 
own antifraud provisions and by further federal preemption of state 
registration authority, especially in regard to small-business capital-
formation activities.  
A. State Antifraud Rules 
Blue sky laws that prohibit fraud, deception, or manipulative 
conduct in connection with the sale of securities make economic sense, 
particularly when backed up by administrative and criminal sanctions 
and private rights of recovery. These state laws, properly enforced, 
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incentivize the issuer to disclose an efficient level of investment 
information to investors.115  
Economists may view potential criminals and law-breakers as 
rational calculators who commit bad acts only when the anticipated 
benefits to the perpetrator exceed the perpetrator’s anticipated costs 
of committing the bad act.116 States can increase the perpetrator’s 
penalty costs of her bad conduct by increasing the actual penalty (for 
example, higher fines and increased jail time and civil fines) or by 
increasing the probability of detection and conviction.117  
State antifraud provisions seem likely to promote an efficient 
allocation of capital by allowing states to impose higher penalty costs 
on perpetrators of manipulation or deception in connection with the 
offer and sale of securities. Congress’s decision in NSMIA not to 
preempt state antifraud authority appears, therefore, to have been 
economically sound.118  
Indeed, efficiency may be further enhanced if states invest more 
in antifraud enforcement. States might accomplish this by reallocating 
resources away from the enforcement and administration of state 
registration rules and reinvesting those resources in the vigorous 
enforcement of the states’ antifraud rules. 
B. State Rules Requiring the Registration of Securities 
Blue sky laws granting states authority over registration were, 
prior to NSMIA, impossible to justify as promoting an economically 
efficient allocation of capital.119 State authority over registration during 
that time not only failed to facilitate the movement of capital to its 
highest and best use but also in many instances significantly impeded 
the efficient allocation of capital. Subjecting capital formation to fifty-
 
 115. See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.  
 116. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 278–87 (8th ed. 2011). Posner 
explains the view that persons committing crimes may be “rational calculators” who determine 
whether to commit a crime on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis. Id. The “costs” to the 
perpetrator include the penalty costs, which are the perceived present negative value to the 
perpetrator of detection and punishment. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. States may actually enjoy efficiencies compared to federal authorities in prosecuting 
these economically bad acts. For example, the proximity of state regulators to the actual 
perpetration of the fraud may make the detection and gathering of information less expensive.  
 119. See Campbell, supra note 35, at 557–67 (discussing the inefficient allocation of capital 
resulting from blue sky laws granting states authority over registration before NSMIA). 
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plus sets of independent rules governing registration increased offering 
costs with no apparent efficiency benefits.  
Regarding the increase in offering costs, assume a situation before 
NSMIA in which a business announced an offering of its securities by 
posting information about the offering on its website or by advertising 
to investors in a widely distributed publication. In such a case the 
business that was seeking capital would likely have been subject to the 
separate and individual registration requirements of each of the fifty-
plus jurisdictions that had blue sky laws. In each state, therefore, the 
issuer would have been required to underwrite the costs of either 
registering its securities under the registration provisions of that 
particular state or meeting the particular state’s requirements for an 
exemption from registration. Even if the offering had been limited to 
four states, the business soliciting for investors would have had to 
underwrite the costs of registration or qualifying for an exemption 
from registration in each of the four states.  
State registration, however, generated no apparent material gain 
in investor protection or efficiency. Investors without the benefit of 
blue sky registration provisions would have been protected by federal 
and state antifraud provisions, which required the issuer to disclose all 
material facts. Investors also would have been protected by federal 
registration requirements, which would have required the issuer either 
to file a registration statement with the Commission and provide a 
prospectus to investors or to qualify for an exemption from the 
registration requirement. Imposing fifty-plus additional state 
registration regimes on top of these significant obligations of the issuer 
would have added no material increase in investor protection or 
efficiency. 
Partial preemption in NSMIA and the JOBS Act of state authority 
over registration, however, has enhanced efficiency. Now, Rule 506 
offerings, offerings by companies traded on a national securities 
exchange, crowdfunding offerings, and Tier 2 Regulation A+ offerings 
are subject to a single, federal set of rules respecting registration. The 
registration regime in those cases is under the administrative oversight 
of the Commission, the most professional, balanced, and resource-rich 
agency operating in this area. That amounts to progress in establishing 
an overall regulatory system that is efficient—one that enhances the 
allocation of capital to the highest and best use at the lowest 
transaction costs.  
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Still, as is the case in the enforcement of antifraud rules, there is 
work left to be done, especially in the area of small-business capital 
formation. Small businesses are vital to our national economy.120 They 
face unique obstacles in their search for external capital. Most 
importantly, their offerings involve high relative transaction costs,121 
and they are usually unable to secure financial intermediation.122 
Imposing fifty-plus registration regimes on these offerings, therefore, 
is especially burdensome on these very important small businesses.  
After the implementation of NSMIA and the JOBS Act, small 
businesses can secure the benefit of preemption for their offerings by 
a Rule 506 offering limited to accredited investors123 or by 
crowdfunding.124 Each of these is economically sound and helpful to 
small businesses, but each is significantly limited. For example, in Rule 
506 offerings limited to accredited investors, those investors may 
amount to 5 percent of the total population,125 excluding perhaps 95 
 
 120. There are more than five million small businesses (businesses with fewer than twenty 
employees) in the United States. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY: A 
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 99–100 tbl.A.6 (2009) (data for year 2006). In recent times, these 
small businesses have accounted for slightly less than 20 percent of total employment in the 
United States. Id. at 101 tbl.A.7 (data for year 2006). For a more detailed historical look at the 
significance of small business, see Campbell, supra note 50, at 84–86. 
 121. “Relative transaction costs” are the offering costs divided by the total size of the offering. 
Thus, in a $100 million deal, offering costs of $1 million generate relative transaction costs of only 
1 percent. In a $1 million deal, offering costs of $1 million generate relative transaction costs of 
100 percent, which kills the offering. Data that I developed show 28.9 percent of all Regulation D 
offerings were for $1 million or less, and 54.8 percent of all Regulation D offerings were for $5 
million or less. Campbell, supra note 51, at 927 tbl.II. 
 122. Data that I developed reflect financial intermediation in only 5.8 percent of Regulation 
D offerings of $1 million or less. Id. at 931 tbl.IX.  
 123. Eliminating the Prohibition Against General Solicitation and General Advertising in 
Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, 78 Fed. Reg. 44,771, 44,804 (July 24, 2013) (to be codified at 
17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c)). Although Rule 506 does not require that all investors be accredited, small 
Rule 506 offerings overwhelmingly are limited to accredited investors in order to relieve small 
issuers from burdensome requirements, such as disclosures, sophistication of investors, and 
prohibition against general advertising, of Rule 506 offerings involving unaccredited investors. 
See Campbell, supra note 51, at 932–33. 
 124. Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388 (Nov. 16, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 200). 
Under the new final Regulation A+ rules, small issuers can also achieve preemption by migrating 
to Tier 2 offerings. The requirements for Tier 2—most importantly, the disclosure requirements—
impose burdens that make Tier 2 offerings under Regulation A+ unattractive to offerings 
involving small amounts of securities. See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. Preliminary 
data suggest that only a few small Regulation A+ offerings migrate to Tier 2. See supra notes  
104–05 and accompanying text. 
 125. Justin Bryan, High-Income Tax Returns for 2012, IRS STAT. INCOME BULL., Summer 
2015, at 2, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/soi-a-inhint-id1510.pdf [https://perma.cc/2H8J-FQR8] 
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percent of the population from the investment opportunity and small 
businesses from a significant demand for their securities. 
Crowdfunding, for example, limits sales strategies to posting the offer 
on the Internet.126 Obviously, not all potential investors are reached 
through this method, and the crowdfunding rules severely restrict the 
issuer from other, more traditional, face-to-face and personalized 
selling techniques.127  
To compete and survive, small businesses need to utilize other 
federal exemptions from registration, such as Rule 504, Rule 505, and 
Tier 1 Regulation A+, as avenues to external capital. But state 
registration requirements may block access to these types of offerings. 
As described above, small businesses have to a large extent abandoned 
offerings under Rule 504 and Rule 505 because of the requirements of 
state registration provisions, and preliminary data indicate that small 
businesses are not using Tier 1 offerings under Regulation A+ for the 
same reason.  
Efficiency in registration rules requires one set of rules generated 
by the most efficient rulemaker. In short, efficiency requires complete 
preemption of state authority over registration, leaving the federal 
government, acting through Congress and the Commission, as the sole 
rulemaker regarding the registration of securities.128  
 
(providing that approximately 3.62 percent of all 2012 tax returns reported an adjusted gross 
income of $200,000 or more). For tax year 2007, see Justin Bryan, High Income Tax Returns for 
2007, IRS STAT. INCOME BULL., Spring 2010, at 4, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10sprbulhiin
ret07.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7NX-FE4Q] (providing that 3.17 percent of all 2007 tax returns 
reported an adjusted gross income of $200,000 or more). 
 126. See 17 C.F.R. § 227.100(a)(3) (2015).  
 127. See id. § 227.204.  
 128. The recently proposed amendment to Rule 147 offers an interesting suggestion, however, 
regarding a possibly efficient role for states’ authority over registration. For a discussion of this 
proposal, see supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text. If one believes that section 3(a)(11)’s 
intrastate exemption is based on the assumption that these local offerings within a single state 
should be a matter for state regulation, then it may make some sense for the federal government 
essentially to turn the matter over to the states. That would require the Commission to relax and 
clarify the federal regulation for the intrastate exemption. Reducing the importance and burden 
of federal regulation in that manner would mean that there would be only one meaningful set of 
rules governing registration, and that would be the rules of the single state in which the offering 
occurred. 
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CONCLUSION 
The history of society’s regulation of capital formation tells us 
much about where we are today and where we may be headed in this 
important economic matter.  
The failure of Congress in 1933 to take away state authority over 
registration was a mistake. But, after all, states were there before the 
federal government, and in 1933 at the depth of the Great Depression, 
legislators likely did not think of the dangers to a market economy of 
overregulation of capital formation.  
Once this dual regulation was set in place within our system of 
federalism, however, it became difficult to correct. States and state 
regulators, it turned out, were tenacious defenders of their authority 
over the registration of securities. The Commission, on the other hand, 
was unwilling to advocate on behalf of preemption and reluctant to 
expand preemption by regulation. The Commission failed to act in this 
regard notwithstanding a broad delegation of authority from Congress 
to preempt state registration authority and clear evidence that 
businesses—especially small businesses—were struggling under the 
burdens and inefficiencies of state registration requirements.  
But some progress toward efficient regulation of capital formation 
has by this point been made. Principally, this is the result of partial 
congressional preemption of state registration authority and 
Congress’s decision not to preempt states’ authority over the 
enforcement of state antifraud rules.  
Efficient regulation can be further enhanced by states reallocating 
resources to enforcement of state antifraud provisions and by  
complete preemption of state authority over registration. With regard 
to further preemption of state registration authority, history  
suggests—unfortunately, rather strongly—that only Congress can 
effect this goal. States, certainly, will not voluntarily surrender their 
authority over registration, and there is no indication that the 
Commission can overcome its longstanding reluctance to expand 
preemption by regulation. Any improvement in the efficient regulation 
of capital formation, especially small-business capital formation, will 
require congressional action.  
 
